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A Decidable Predicate Logic of Knowledge
Abstract
The language we consider is that of classical first order logic augmented with the unary modal operator □.
Sentences of this language are regarded as true or false in a knowledge-base KB, which is any finite set of □-free
formulas. Truth of □α in KB is understood as that α is true in all classical models of KB and this interpretation
is intended to capture the intuition "we know that α" behind □α.
The resulting logic is, in general, undecidable and not even semidecidable. However, there is a natural
fragment of the above language, called the constructive language, which yields a decidable logic. The only
syntactic constraint in the constructive language is that there exists x should always be followed by □. That is,
we are not allowed to simply say "there is x such that ..." and we can only say "there is x for which we know that
...". Under this constraint, truth of there existsxα(x) will always imply that an object x for which α(x) holds not
only exists, but can be effectively found. This is generally what we want of there exists in practical applications:
knowing that "there exists a combination c that opens safe S" has no significance unless such a combination c
can actually be found, which, in our semantics, will be equivalent to saying that there is c for which we know
that c opens S. So, it is only truth of the sentence there existsc□OPENS(c,S) that really matters, and the latter,
unlike there existsc□OPENS(c,S) is a perfectly legal formula of the constructive language.
I introduce a decidable sequent system C K N in the constructive language and prove its soundness and
completeness with respect to the above semantics.
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Abstract
The language we consider is that of classical  rst order logic aug
mented with the unary modal operator   Sentences of this language
are regarded as true or false in a knowledge base KB which is any
 nite set of  free formulas Truth of    in KB is understood as
that   is true in all classical models of KB and this interpretation is
intended to capture the intuition we know that   behind   
The resulting logic is in general undecidable and not even semi
decidable However there is a natural fragment of the above language
called the constructive language which yields a decidable logic The
only syntactic constraint in the constructive language is that  x should
always be followed by   That is we are not allowed to simply say
there is x such that  and we can only say there is x for which
we know that  Under this constraint truth of  x x will always
imply that an object x for which  x holds not only exists but can
 
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 
be eectively found This is generally what we want of   in practical
applications	 knowing that there exists a combination c that opens
safe S has no signi cance unless such a combination c can actually
be found which in our semantics will be equivalent to saying that
there is c for which we know that c opens S So it is only truth
of the sentence  c OPENSc S that really matters and the latter
unlike  c OPENSc S is a perfectly legal formula of the constructive
language
I introduce a decidable sequent system CKN in the constructive
language and prove its soundness and completeness with respect to
the above semantics
  Introduction
The nonconstructive character of classical existential quantier has many
times been criticized Letting alone the philosophy on the right of existence
of the classical notion of existence I will only point out that it has no practical
meaning Consider the sentence
 cOPENSc  S 
asserting that there is a combination c that opens safe S Knowing that this
sentence is true has little signicance unless we can actually nd a particular
combination which opens S In other words there must be a combination
C such that we know that OPENSC S is true This can be expressed by
the sentence
 c OPENSc  S 
where   is read as we know that
This consideration suggests an idea how to make classical rst order logic
constructive and practically meaningful rst add to the language of the
latter a knowledge operator   and then restrict the resulting language by
allowing usage of quantiers only in combination with   as in the above
example That is we should not be allowed to simply say there is x such
that  and we can only say there is x for which we know that 
On the second thought existential quantier is nothing but a big dis	
junction and one might ask the question why we don
t impose similar re	

strictions on the usage of  The point is that the disjunction
OPENSC   S OPENSC  S 
although not as good as
 OPENSC   S  OPENSC  S 
is still reasonably constructive as it envisages only a bounded number of in
particular two possibilities if this disjunction is true all we need to do to
open S is to try both combinations C  and C whereas knowing the truth
of  cOPENSc  S doesn
t save our day unless dialing innitely many or
say 
 
combinations is feasible
Our approach on one hand extends the expressive power of classical rst
order logic by adding the knowledge operator to it and on the other hand
restricts some expressiveness of the latter by limiting the usage of quantiers
as I tried to convince the reader however this restriction can be viewed as
just cleansing classical logic of practically meaningless constructs
Most importantly as we will see later our approach induces a decidable
predicate logic which nicely contrasts with the undecidability of classical
logic to say nothing about the non	semidecidability of the syntactic logics
of knowledge  or epistemic logics studied within the framework of non	
monotonic logics   
 The full language
We start by dening the syntax and semantics of the full language L of the
predicate modal logic of knowledge
L has an innite set V of variables a nonempty nite or innite set
C of constants and a nonempty nite or innite set R of predicate letters
together with a function that assigns to everyR  R a natural number called
the arity of R We also dene the set of terms as V  C
The set of formulas of L is the smallest set of expressions such that
 Rt
 
       t
n
 is an atomic formula for any n	ary relation symbol R 
R and any terms t
 
       t
n

 if  is a formula then  is a formula

 if  and  are formulas then    is a formula
 if  is a formula then   is a formula
 if  is a formula and x is a variable then  x is a formula
When this does not lead to confusions we will be omitting some paren	
theses in formulas
We will be using   	  where     as dened operators
We also adopt the following standard notational convention If x
 
       x
n

denotes a formula where the x
i
are variables which do not necessarily have
to have free occurrence in the formula as well as not all free variables of the
formula have to be among x
 
       x
n
 then t
 
       t
n
 where the t
i
are
terms denotes the result of substituting each free occurrence of each x
i
by
t
i
in x
 
       x
n

Formulas without free variables will be called sentences and formulas not
containing   will be said to be pure
If x
 
       x
n
 is a formula with exactly x
 
       x
n
free and c
 
       c
n
are
constants then c
 
       c
n
 is said to be an instance of x
 
       x
n

De nition  A world is a function w which assigns to each atomic sen	
tenceRc one of the values fT rue  F alseg We write j
w
 for w  T 
The relation j
w
is extended to all pure sentences in the following way
 j
w
 i 
j
w

 j
w
   i j
w
 or j
w

 j
w
 xx i there is a constant c such that j
w
c
Thus a world w is nothing but a classical structure with the universe C
and for a pure sentence  j
w
 means nothing but that  is classically
true in this structure Note the two simplifying assumptions we make vs
the traditional approach First we assume that every object of the universe
has a unique name in our language a constant Second we identify these
objects with their names These assumptions make life much easier
De nition  A knowledge base is a nite possibly empty set of pure
formulas

De nition  A world w is said to be a possible world for a knowledge	base
KB i for every instance 
 
of every   KB j
w

 
 This means nothing
but that w as a classical structure is a model of KB
A knowledge	base KB is said to be consistent i it has at least one
possible world and KB is complete i it has at most one possible world
Intuitively the knowledge	base is all our knowledge of the world This
knowledge is usually only partial unless the knowledge	base is complete Dif	
ferent possible worlds correspond to dierent possible completions of the
missing information and they are equal candidates to be the real world
The reason why we don
t allow non	pure formulas in a knowledge	base
is simple the denition of the exact semantics of   as a knowledge op	
erator is going to appeal to what is contained in our knowledge	base and
including formulas containing   in the latter would make that kind of de	
nition intuitively circular Also we want our knowledge	base to contain only
objective information  information about the outside world such informa	
tion is stable and we can safely expand it by adding new true facts to the
knowledge	base whereas if we had say the formula   there then adding
at some point the knowledge  would make the knowledge	base intuitively
inconsistent
De nition  Let KB be a knowledge	base and w be a world We say
that a sentence  is true in KB with respect to w  and write KB j
w

i one of the following conditions holds
  is atomic and j
w

    and KB 
j
w

      and KB j
w
 or KB j
w

     and for every possible world u for KB KB j
u

    xx and for some constant c  C KB j
w
c
And we say that a sentence  is simply true in KB  and write KB j 
i for every possible world w for KB KB j
w
 In other words  is true
in KB i KB j
w
  for any or some w

Thus intuitively   is true if we know that  where knowing  means
that the truth of  follows exclusively from our knowledge	base so that it
doesn
t matter which of the possible worlds is the real world
Note that if  is a pure sentence then its truth in KB with respect to w
does not depend on KB and KB j
w
 i j
w

 The constructive language
The constructive language L
c
 whose formulas will be referred to as construc 
tive formulas is the fragment of L where formulas are allowed to contain  x
only if it is immediately followed by  
And a constructive knowledge base is a knowledge	base consisting only of
constructive formulas
For a philosophy on why this fragment is natural and what it is good for
see the Introduction
Another way to present the constructive language is to take the full lan	
guage L without any syntactic constraints but change the semantics of it so
that  x is simply understood as  x  This might look more impressive but
not quite fair and we will not do that
The above syntactic constraint may seem too inconvenient nesting of
quantiers induces nesting of modal operators and the meaning of a formula
with deeply nested  
s becomes not very intuitive However one can show
that every such formula is logically equivalent to a formula without nested
modal operators This is natural taking into account that our modal operator
is in fact an S	modality which as it is well known allows to eliminate
nesting of  
s
Also theorem   below establishes that the constructive language has
the same expressive power as the much bigger language called the relaxed
constructive language L
rc
 which is dened as the fragment of L where
whenever  x is applied to a subformula x all free occurrences of x in
the latter should be in the scope of  
We say that two formulas x
 
       x
n
 and x
 
       x
n
 whose all
free variables are among x
 
       x
n
 are logically equivalent  and write
x
 
       x
n
  x
 
       x
n
 i for every knowledge	base KB world w and
tuple c
 
       c
n
of constants
KB j
w
c
 
       c
n
  KB j
w
c
 
       c
n


For two sublanguages L  and L of L we read L   L as saying that
there is an eective function f  L   L called an interpreter such that
for every formula   L    f
And we say that L  and L are equivalent in expressive power i L  
L and L  L 
Theorem  The languages L
c
and L
rc
are equivalent
Proof is given in Section 
In view of this theorem it suces to study only L
c
 and we can safely
use the more relaxed formulas of L
rc
 viewing them as shorthands for their
equivalent L
c
	formulas and entrusting their legalization to the interpreter
Allowing only constructive knowledge	bases means that the knowledge	
bases unlike queries we consider cannot use quantiers because a con	
structive formula containing a quantier should also contain a   whereas a
knowledge	base should consist of only pure formulas This too may seem
restrictive However the eect of external universal quantiers in a construc	
tive knowledge	base can be achieved by using free variables which we know
is legal and most of the basic scientic or everyday knowledge  whether
it be general rules or individual facts  does not require any other sort of
quantication
Eg where Ax  y  z means x  y  z and Sx  y means x
 
 y ie
x   y the recursive denition of addition in terms of successor y  y
x
 
 y  x  y
 
  can be captured by the constructive knowledge	base
consisting of the following two formulas
 A  y  y
 Sx
 
  x

  Sz
 
  z

  Ax
 
  y  z
 
 Ax

  y  z


To see possible applications of our logic in knowledge	base or database
systems consider an example knowledge	base of a dating service which con	
sists of the following constructive formulas

  LIKESJon  x BLONDEx  GOODLOOKINGx a neces	
sary and sucient condition for Jon to like someone is that the someone
is blonde and good	looking
 LIKESBob  x BLONDEx Bob likes only blondes
 LIKESBob  x ASIANx Bob likes only Asians
 ASIANx BLONDEx no Asian is blonde
 BLONDEAnn
 GOODLOOKINGAnn
 ASIANSue
 BLONDEPeg
Is there an undoubted match for Jon This query is expressedby
 x LIKESJon  x 
and a system based on our logic would answer YES to this question Then
as I promised that existential quantier was going to be constructive in our
logic we could condently ask the system to nd a particular x for which
 LIKESJon  x holds and we would get  LIKESJon Ann Jon will
denitely like Ann so we would recommend Jon to meet Ann We will also
inferLIKESJon  Peg Jon might like Peg so that it makes sense for Jon
to try to nd out more about Peg And we will infer  LIKESJon  Sue
Jon denitely will not like Sue so Jon should not waste time on Sue As
for Bob he will never nd a match unless he reconsiders his taste we can
infer the relaxed constructive sentence 	xLIKESBob  x
 Logic CKN
We now describe a sequent calculus CKB The singularity of CKN is that
it has two sorts  positive and negative  of sequents
A sequent is a triple    positive sequent or  
  negative
sequent where  is a constructive knowledge	base and  is a nite set of
constructive sentences

The intended meaning of    resp  
  is that the disjunction
of the elements of  is resp is not true in the knowledge	base 
Level  sequent is a synonym of sequent
A level  sequent is a sequent containing only pure formulas
A level  sequent is a sequent containing only pure sentences
Finally a level  sequent is a sequent containing only atomic sentences
By the standard abuse of notation if  is a set of formulas and  is a
formula we will write    or   for   fg
Without loss of generality we may assume that C  f       ng or C 
f         g Then we say that a constant c is active in a sequent S if c
occurs in some formula of S or c is the least constant not occurring in S
And c is strictly active if c occurs in S or there are no constants in S and
c  
The inference rules listed below have the form
S
 
   S
n
S

 
possibly n   and possibly with some additional conditions on S

  S
 
       S
n

S

is called the conclusion and S
 
       S
n
the premises of the rule
We say that a set Sq of sequents is closed under a set Rl of rules if
whenever
S
 
   S
n
S

is a rule of Rl S
 

  S
 
 
       S
 
n
are sequents of the form S

  S
 
       S
n
 respec	
tively and they satisfy all additional conditions if any stated in the rule
and if n   or S
 
 
       S
 
n
 Sq then S
 

 Sq
In the rules below  is a variable ranging over f  
g so that each
rule with  in fact represents two rules one with  and the other with 

Also all the sequents in a level	i rule i          are assumed to be level	i
sequents
The logic CKN is dened as the smallest set of sequents closed under the
following rules

LEVEL	 RULES AXIOMS
R	
 
 
where   is nonempty
R
	
 
 
 
where   is empty
LEVEL	  RULES
R 	
   
  

R	
  
  

R 	
 
 
  

 
 
 
 

 

R 	
  
 
    

 
  
 
 

 

R 
	
a
  
 

 
  
 
 


 
 b
  


 
  
 
 


 

 
LEVEL	 RULES
R	
  c
 
       c
n
 
  x 
 
where c
 
       c
n
are all the strictly active constants of the conclusion
LEVEL	 RULES
R 	
  
  

R 	
 
 
  

 
 
 
 

 

R 	
 
 
   

 
 
 
 

 

R
 	
a
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

 
 b
 
 

 
 
 
 
 

 

R  	
a
  
   
 b
 
   

R
  	
 
   
 
 
   

R  	
a
 
 
   
 b
 
   

  
R
  	
   
 
 
   

R  	
 c 
  xx 
 
where c is an active constant of the conclusion
R
  	
 
 c
 
      
 c
n
 
 
  xx 
 
where c
 
       c
n
are all the active constants of the conclusion
R  	
 c
 
      c
n
 
  xx 
 
where c
 
       c
n
are all the active constants of the conclusion
R
  	
 
 c 
 
  xx 
 
where c is an active constant of the conclusion
 The main results
The relation KB j  is naturally extended to KB j  where  is any
nite set of sentences in the following way Let  be the disjunction of
all the elements of  We may assume that we have an always	false atomic
sentence  in the language and if  is empty understand  as  Then
we dene KB j  as KB j  Our original relation KB j  is thus a
special case of KB j  where   fg Notice also that KB j  means
nothing but that KB is inconsistent
As CKN is in fact a deductive system with the conclusions of the level	
rules as axioms and all the other rules as proper rules of inference we will
write CKN  S for S  CKN 
 
Lemma 
 Dual soundness of CKN For any sequent KB  
 a If CKN  KB   then KB j 
 b If CKN  KB 
  then KB 
j 
Proof is given in Section 
Lemma 
 Syntactic completeness of CKN For any sequent KB  
either CKN  KB   or CKN  KB 
 
Proof is given in Section 
Theorem 
 CKN is decidable
Proof	 This is an immediate consequence of the above two lemmas
taking into account that the rules of CKN are eective End of proof
Theorem 
 Soundness and completeness of CKN For any sequent
KB  
KB j  i CKN  KB  
Proof	 The if part has been established in Lemma  a For the only
if part suppose CKN 
 KB   Then by Lemma  CKN  KB 

 whence by Lemma  b KB 
j  End of proof
Fact 

 Constructiveness of   There is an eective method which for
any constructive knowledge base KB and constructive sentence  xx with
KB j  xx nds a constant c such that KB j c
Proof	 If KB j  xx then by  CKN proves KB   xx
The last rule in that proof can be only R   which means that CKN 
KB  c for some constant c active in KB   xx Check whether
CKN  KB  c for each such constant c and return a c for which you
get a positive answer In view of the decidability of CKN  this can be done
eectively End of proof
 
 Proof of Lemma  
We proceed by induction on the length of a CKN 	proof of the sequent
KB   or KB 
  should be the conclusion of one of the  rules of
CKN  and correspondingly we need to consider  cases
For better readability we will identify  with 
Recall that when  is a pure sentence and so are all the formulas in
level	 and level	  rules as well as the instances of formulas in level	 rules
then KB j
w
 i j
w

Case R Let     since   is nonempty in this rule such
an  exists Then for every possible world w for  we have j
w
 which
implies that  j  because  is a disjunct of 
Case R
 Let w be the world such that for every atomic sentence
 we have j
w
 i    Thus w is a possible world for  On the other
hand 
j
w
 because since  is empty for no disjunct  of  do we have
j
w
 Thus  
j 
Case R  Suppose    j  the induction hypothesis We need
to show that  j   Let w be an arbitrary possible world for  It
suces to show that j
w
  If j
w
 we are done otherwise we have
j
w
 which means that w is a possible world for    whence as    j 
j
w
 and we are done again
Case R
  Suppose    
j  the induction hypothesis We need
to show that  
j   Let w be a possible world for    such that 
j
w

But notice that 
j
w
 and therefore 
j
w
  which as we deal with
pure sentences means that  
j  
Cases of the remaining level	  rules are similar
Case R It suces to observe that every possible world for   x
is a possible world for   c
 
       c
n

Case R
 Suppose   c
 
       c
n
 
j  We need to show that
  x 
j  Let w be a possible world for   c
 
       c
n
 such that
 

j
w
 For every formula  let 

denote the result of replacing in 
every constant c 
 fc
 
       c
n
g by c
 
 Let u be the world such that for every
atomic sentence  j
u
 i j
w


 It is easy to verify by induction on the
complexity of  that for any pure constructive sentence 
j
u
 i j
w


  
Therefore since 

  and 
j
w
 we have 
j
u
 So it remains to
show that u is a possible world for   x
First consider an arbitrary x
 
       x
m
   whose free variables are
exactly x
 
       x
m
 Let d
 
       d
m
be any constants We need to show that
j
u
d
 
       d
m
 ie in view of   that j
w
d
 
       d
m


 But notice
that d
 
       d
m


is an instance of x
 
       x
m
 and since w is a possible
world for  we indeed have j
w
d
 
       d
m



Now it remains to consider instances of x Suppose all the free vari	
ables of x are among x  x
 
       x
m
 so that x  x  x
 
       x
m
 Let
d  d
 
       d
m
be arbitrary constants We need to show that j
u
d  d
 
       d
m

ie in view of   that j
w
d  d
 
       d
m


 But notice that if d  c
i
for
some c
i
 fc
 
       c
n
g then d  d
 
       d
m


is an instance of c
i
 and
otherwise it is an instance of c
 
 In either case since w is a possible world
for   c
 
       c
n
 we have j
w
d  d
 
       d
m



Cases R  R 
  R  R 
  R 
R
  are rather straightforward
Case R   The subcase b is straightforward and for the subcase
a it suces to observe that  j  implies  j  
Case R
   Suppose  
j  and  
j  Let w be a possible world
for  such that  
j
w
 Observe that then  
j
w
   Hence  
j   
Case R   The subcase b is straightforward and for the subcase
a it suces to observe that  
j  implies  j  
Case R
   Similar to case R 
  
Case R   is straightforward
 
Case R
   Suppose  
j c
 
  and  and  
j c
n
  Since
we deal with constructive sentences x must have the form  x Thus
we have
 
j  
and
 
j  c
 
        
j  c
n
 
We claim that
For every constant c  
j  c 
Indeed if c  fc
 
       c
n
g then  
j  c by  Suppose now c 

fc
 
       c
n
g We may suppose that c
n
is the constant that does not ap	
pear in the conclusion of the rule Let w be a possible world for  such that
 
j
w
c
n
 By  such a world exists Let then u be the world that evalu	
ates every atom just as w does only with the roles of c and c
n
interchanged
Since neither c nor c
n
appear in  or x it is clear that u just as w is a
possible world for  and also as  
j
w
c
n
 we have  
j
u
c Hence
 
j  c and  is thus proved
Clearly  implies that for every world v  
j
v
 x x and this
together with  implies that  
j  x x 
Case R   As in the previous case x must have the form
 x So suppose  j  c
 
  and  and  j  c
n
  If  j 
then  j  x x  and we are done Otherwise let w be a world such
that  
j
w
 Consider any c
i
 fc
 
       c
n
g We have  j
w
 c
i
 
and  
j
w
 Hence  j
w
 c
i
 Consequently there is a possible world
u for  such that  
j
u
c
i
 and this implies that  j  c
i
 Thus we
have
 j  c
 
        j  c
n

Using an argument similar to the one employed in the proof of  we get
that for every constant c  j  c This implies that  j  x x
and thus  j  x x 
Case R
   is simple
Lemma   is proved
 
 Proof of Lemma 
Dene the complexity of a formula  as the number of occurrences of logical
operators in  plus the number of distinct free variables of  Next dene
the complexity of a sequent S as the innite sequence ha

  a
 
    i where each
a
i
is the number of formulas of S of complexity i Dene the well	ordering
relation  on such complexities by ha

  a
 
    i  hb

  b
 
    i i there is i
such that a
i
 b
i
and for all j with j 	 i a
j
 b
j

 
Now we can prove the lemma by induction on the complexity ofKB  
Suppose KB   is a level	 sequent KB   is either empty or
nonempty In the rst case CKN  KB 
  by R 
 and in the second
case CKN  KB   by R
Suppose now KB   is a level	i sequent but not level	i   sequent
for some i  f     g Note that then it matches the conclusion of one of
the level	i rules with a positive sequent in the conclusion There are thus
  cases to consider R  R  R  R  R
R  R  R  R   R   R  
R   We will consider only one of them R  as an example
and all the other cases can be handled in a rather similar way
So suppose KB   is a level	  sequent of the form   
 
 where
we may suppose  
 
 
 If CKN does not prove this sequent then in
view of R  CKN 
     
 
 Note that     
 
has a strictly
lower complexity than   
 
 Therefore by the induction hypothesis
CKN     
 
 
 But then by R
 CKN   
  
 

Lemma  is proved
 Proof of Theorem  
Let us say that two formulas  and  are mutually safe if they have exactly
the same free variables and for every such variable x if all free occurrences
of x in  are in the scope of   then so are they in  and vice versa
We will say that  and  are safely equivalent  and write    if
 and  are mutually safe and   
 
Thus   is the standard ordering relation on ordinals less than  
 
  where each com
plexity ha

 a
 
 a

   i is represented by the ordinal    a

  

 a
 
  
 
 a

  



 
The following lemma can be veried by a routine analysis of the appro	
priate denitions and we state it without a proof
Lemma  Let  and  be any formulas of L and x be any variable
 If    and the formula A is the result of replacing  by  in
the formula A then A  A
 If    is a classical propositional tautology then   	 if at the
same time  and  are mutually safe then   
  x     x   x

 If  does not contain x free then  x       x
         
      
      
   x    x 
   x    x 
We now start proving Theorem   L
c
 L
rc
holds trivially so we only
need to show that L
rc
 L
c

Let  be an arbitrary formula of L
rc
 Below we give an interpreter
s
strategy converting  into a safely equivalent constructive formula The
correctness of this strategy is veried by induction on the complexity of 
We will be using    without explicitly referring to it
If  is atomic return  unchanged
If    then convert  into a safely equivalent constructive formula

 
which by the induction hypothesis can be done and return 
 
 By
     
 

Similarly if      or    
Now suppose    x First convert  into a safely equivalent construc	
tive formula 
 
 Next convert 
 
into a formula 

such that   

is a
tautology and


 
 
     
n
 
where for each    i  n

i
 
i
 
     
i
k
i
 

i
 
     

i
m
i
 
where each 
i
j
is an atom with or without negation and each 

i
j
is of the
form  
  
  y 
 or  y 
 That is convert 
 
into a tautologically
equivalent disjunctive normal form where formulas of the form  
 and  y 

are treated as propositional atoms Naturally we suppose that each such
atom actually has an occurrence in 
 
and that occurrence is not in the
scope of a non	Boolean operator   or   In view of this note that
no 
i
j
contains x 
for otherwise 
 
would have an occurrence of x not in the scope of   and as

 
and  are mutually safe so would have  which would contradict our
assumption that  x is a formula of L
rc

Clearly 
 
and 

are mutually safe and therefore by   

 
 

whence 

  Note also that since 
 
is constructive so is every 
i
j
and 

i
j

For each    i  n let

i
 
i
 
     
i
k
i
  x 

i
 
     

i
m
i

Thus 
i
is constructive We claim that

i
  x
i
 
To show this rst note that by  and  
 x
i
 
i
 
     
i
k
i
  x

i
 
     

i
m
i
 
By  	


i
 
     

i
m
i
  

i
 
      

i
m
i
 
whence by  


i
 
     

i
m
i
  

i
 
     

i
m
i

Hence
 x

i
 
     

i
m
i
   x 

i
 
     

i
m
i

 
which together with  implies that 
i
  x
i
  is thus proved
Let

 
 
 
     
n

In view of 

 
  x
 
      x
n
 
whence by  

 
  x
 
     
n
 
ie 
 
  x

 But we know that 

  Hence 
 
  x And as
the 
i

s are constructive 
 
is constructive too
So let the interpreter return 
 
for our initial formula  x
This completes the proof of Theorem  
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